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Social Logic as Business Logic: Guanxi, 
Trustworthiness, and the Embeddedness of 
Chinese Business Practices 
 
WAI-KEUNG CHUNG AND GARY G. HAMILTON 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the nature of Chinese business practices by looking at their social foundations. We 
argue that the use of an inter-subjective logic based on the norms of social relationships provides an 
institutional foundation for economic transactions in Chinese business settings. The logic of social 
relationships-or what we call guanxi logic-is embedded in daily practices of the Chinese business 
community. Rather than making economic decisions less "economic", relational rules embedded in guanxi 
places interpersonal business transactions within a prescriptive framework, thereby increasing the 
calculability of economic outcomes. Guanxi logic is, therefore, a socially meaningful way to enhance 
economic rationality. Although relational rules play a role in Chinese economic practices similar to that of 
a legal framework in Western economic practices, the results are quite different. Whereas Western legal 
norms depersonalise market activity, Chinese relational rules personalise transactions, making them part 
of the interpersonal social matrix of daily life. 
 
 
WHAT IS GUANXI? 
 
The first step in our discussion is to clarify the meaning of guanxi. In the Chinese language, 
guanxi carries several different connotations.1 In the most general sense, guanxi simply 
means “relationship”. Any social relationship – for example, the relationship between parents 
and children or between teachers and students -- can be identified by the term guanxi. In this 
sense, the word does not carry any necessary connotations about how those relationships 
work. 
 
The second usage carries the more specific meaning that most Chinese associate with the 
word. Guanxi identifies a subset of relationships that work according to the norms of 
reciprocity. Parent/child or teacher/student relationships are hierarchical and not, strictly 
speaking, based on the expectations of reciprocation. However, a broad range of relationships 
in everyday life are less formally structured and less hierarchical in nature, and a great many 
of these relationships are defined normatively by the principle of reciprocity. So important 
are these relationships in Chinese society that some scholars (e.g., King, 1991; Fei, 1992) 
claim that guanxi is a fundamental organisational principle of Chinese society, ranking in 
importance with familial piety (xiao). “To a significant degree”, said Ambrose King (1991: 
79), “the cultural dynamic of guanxi building is a source of vitality in Chinese society”. 
 
A third and decidedly pejorative connotation of guanxi has emerged in contemporary 
Mainland China. This third meaning refers to “the use of someone’s authority to obtain 
political or economic benefits by unethical person(s)” (Xinci Xinyu Cidan, 1989: 92). Guanxi 
or guanxixue represents a way to bypass laws and regulations through personal connections 
                                                          
1
 Guanxi has been translated into English in different ways. They include social relationship, social connection, 
personal relationship, particularistic relationship and personal tie. Guanxi certainly is about relationship or 
connection, but none of those translation conveys the idea of how people are related or connected in a Chinese 
context. Since the cultural meaning of guanxi is more than what can be represented by the term “relationship” 
or “connection”, we prefer not to translate it. 
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with state officials or with people who control scarce resources. Different from the second 
meaning, guanxi here refers to “a system that depends on the institutional structure of society 
rather than on culture” (Guthrie, 1998: 255). Most studies that are related to economic 
reforms in China discuss guanxi in this sense (e.g., Agelasto, 1996; Davies et al., 1995; 
Hsing, 1997; Xin and Pearce, 1996; Yang, 1994).2 In this chapter, we will focus primarily on 
the second usage of the term guanxi, with some discussion in the conclusion on the third 
meaning of the term.3 
 
In a concise way, then, the second meaning of guanxi implies the following characteristics: 
(1) The relationship between two persons is situational and informal, in the sense that both 
parties to the relationship have discretion over how the relationship is defined.4 
(2) Once both parties agree to a relationship, there is an assumption that the principle of 
reciprocity will be observed. When there is a guanxi between two persons, a favour granted 
from one side will be returned, at least in principle, by the other side. 
(3) The promise of reciprocity rests on the personal trust (xinyong) that exists between the 
two persons. Additional feelings of mutual trustworthiness develop as each act of reciprocity 
is realised. 
(4) The feelings of personal trust are normatively displayed through expressions of ganging, 
that is human emotions and affection. 
(5) The development of guanxi usually refers to a relatively long-term and stable relationship, 
or at least one that is expected to be long-lived.5 
(6) In order for the relationship to remain effective, guanxi has to be “cultivated” after it is 
established. 
(7) Guanxi is not an all-or-nothing concept. Guanxi can be of various degrees of strength and 
stability. 
(8) Guanxi is a selective attachment. By definition, one cannot have a guanxi relationship 
with everyone. 
 
What is important to guanxi is the recognition of a mutual commitment. The guanxi logic will 
be launched and the relationship will be proceeded only when both sides are interested in 
further development of the guanxi. Therefore, when people say they have good guanxi with 
another person, they mean that they have known the other person for a relatively long time 
and that they have helped each other before. Also, they know that the other person is willing 
to do them a favour if there is a need, a favour that may not be available to everyone. If such 
a favour is given, then the other has an obligation to reciprocate at some point in the future. 
 
                                                          
2
 There are also studies that look at guanxi in a more general sense. There is a literature that focuses on whether 
guanxi or networks matter in marketing. Luo (1997), e.g., studies how foreign invested enterprises benefit from 
an extensive guanxi network by creating more efficient marketing performance. Others include Davies et al. 
(1995), Abramson and Ai (1997). See also Bian (1997) for a focus on the relationship between jobseeking and 
guanxi in China. 
 
3
 Seemingly oblivious to the nuances of the term, many studies do not distinguish the differences between these 
two usages. 
 
4
 Sometimes guanxi can be used to refer to relationships between groups or organisations, but they are 
connected mainly through personal ties. 
 
5
 Almost by definition, short-term relationships cannot be guanxi. Accordingly, it is redundant to say “long-term 
guanxi”. 
Social Logic as Business Logic 3 
 
 
 
 
A THREE-DIMENSIONAL VIEW OF GUANXI 
 
The rules of reciprocity structure guanxi relationships. From an individual’s point of view, 
selectivity and the management are the all-important aspects of having social relationships 
outside the close circle of family members. To understand how guanxi works, it is essential to 
understand the processes of selecting and managing these social relationships. 
 
A widely accepted conception is that guanxi is most easily established between people with 
“a commonality of shared identification” (Jacobs, 1979: 243). People with a common 
background, such as people from the same kin group, native place, school, occupation, or 
even surname, will find it easier to establish a reciprocal bond. A shared background, which 
we might think of as a foundation for developing guanxi, cannot guarantee that a ‘stable’ 
guanxi can be developed. There is, however, a rather imprecise rule of thumb about which 
“categories of social relations” (Landa, 1994)6 are the most likely to produce long-lasting 
relationships. In principle, for instance, one's cousin is supposed to be more important than 
someone with the same surname; people who attended the same school may be considered to 
be “closer” than people who share the same occupation. This difference in the ranking of 
categories, however, makes a difference only in the initial stages of guanxi formation. One's 
kinsman does not necessarily have a “better” guanxi with you than someone from your 
workplace. If shared attributes were the key factors determining guanxi, then it would not 
take so long or so much careful attention to create good guanxi connections. Although some 
form of shared attribute may be a precondition for the establishment of guanxi, that attribute 
gives no indication of the actual degree of closeness within a particular guanxi relationship. 
In the end, all such rules of thumb are situation-specific and applied on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The closeness of a guanxi relationship between two persons depends not as much on the 
social category of sameness as on the perceived qualities that each sees in the other. To 
explain how people assess the nature and the degree of closeness of their own guanxi 
relationships, we should look at three analytically distinctive dimensions: normative, 
instrumental and affective. A close guanxi can exist or be developed for different reasons. 
Two persons can be close because they are bound by obligations, or because they have strong 
affection for each other, or because they are instrumentally related to each other. Most of the 
time, there is a combination of the above three dimensions. To determine the nature, strength 
and stability of a guanxi, we should, therefore, look at the combined magnitude of these three 
dimensions. 
 
 
Normative Dimension 
 
Guanxi often develops because two individuals are tied to each through some kind of 
prescriptive relationship. In colloquial terms, such prescriptive nonnuclear family 
relationships are routinely categorised as being either relatives or friends (qinqi pengyou). It 
                                                          
6
 See also Tsui and Farh (1997: 60), who propose the same idea, and suggest that guanxi bases “are major 
determinants of the strength or closeness of interpersonal relationships in China”. 
 
Social Logic as Business Logic 4 
 
is important to recognise that one's family and one’s relatives are carefully distinguished 
categories, each of which has many subcategories. Family here refers to the family members 
who are under the same fang (i.e., the same branch of a larger family) and not family in some 
loose sense. Family relationships are not guanxi relationships. One cannot say, for instance, 
that one has “guanxi” with one’s father or that one need to “la guanxi” (pull connections) 
with one’s brother. Family members are “close” (qin), their relationships are not normatively 
defined by reciprocity or strictly instrumental interests, but rather by filial piety (xiao) and 
required interpersonal responsibilities, which are normatively defined by generation, gender, 
and seniority (Baker, 1979). These same family principles apply to a lesser degree to one’s 
interactions with relatives outside one’s immediate branch of the family, and even less yet to 
friends and colleagues. More distant relatives, therefore, are potentially open for establishing 
a guanxi relationship. 
 
Within each of these broad categories of relatives and friends, there are many subcategories.7 
China’s eminent social scientist, Fei Xiaotong (1992), describes these differential categories 
as the primary organisational features of Chinese society. All types of social activities are 
structured through these differential categories of relationships. In principle, individuals 
relate to each category of people with a distinctive set of norms and obligations.8 The sets of 
social relationships that each individual maintains form a matrix of personal relationships. 
The degree of interpersonal “closeness” is, in part, a function of the categorical norms and 
obligations that link two people together. For instance, relationships between oneself and 
one’s relatives are determined normatively according to the nature of their relatedness within 
the lineage structure.9 One’s immediate uncle, for instance, is closer than one’s wife’s uncle, 
and one’s cousin is closer than one's cousin's wife. In terms of normative expectations, one 
would be more obliged to take care of a paternal than an affinal uncle. Here, exchanges of 
favour between relatives are based on obligation and not on instrumental calculation. 
One should help when the social norms oblige one to do so. Categories of relationships 
among relatives are, therefore, hierarchical in terms of closeness and extent of obligation, and 
the norms of reciprocity are sometimes reinforced and sometime compromised by the norms 
of family responsibility. As many writers point out, Chinese are often reluctant to enter into 
guanxi relationships with relatives because family obligations may override instrumental 
needs. 
 
                                                          
7
 Qinqi Pengyou (relatives and friends), as an expression in everyday use, portrays the social world beyond the 
family of typical Chinese. In Chinese rural life, for example, this expression is further subdivided. There will be 
a relatively distinct category for fellow villagers (xiangqin) which is in between relatives and friends. But at the 
same time we can still put it into the non-relative category (i.e., as friends) (Kipnis, 1997.254). 
 
8
 Fei’s (1992) idea of chaxugeju (differential mode of association) suggests that the Chinese relate to each other 
according to the category of social relationship. 
 
9
 Hwang (1987) only put family relationships as expressive or emotional relationships and has neglected their 
normative base. In fact, the normative aspect may be more crucial in shaping the relationships within the family 
than the emotional aspect. You may not like your family members but you have to conform, by and large, to the 
normative obligations assigned by external social norms. As Hwang also acknowledged, conflicts within 
Chinese families are not uncommon. To suggest that family relationships should be classified as ties that “render 
an individual’s feelings of affection, warmth, safety, and attachment” overemphasises the emotional base of the 
family relationships. Family ties are better viewed as strongly prescriptive obligations that can be shaped and 
further strengthened by both affection and instrumental considerations. 
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Friends, however, are normatively not as close as relatives, and therefore often make better 
candidates for a guanxi relationship. Normative expectations still structure the relations 
among friends,10 but the expectations that govern these relationships are less restrictive. 
Among friends, there are fewer required obligations, and so there is a better opportunity to 
negotiate a relationship that is mutually satisfying and advantageous to both parties. The 
relationships between qinren (family and relatives) have the strongest normative constraints 
and obligations, those between shuren (familiar persons) have fewer, but still significant, 
constraints and finally those between shenren (strangers) have only the most general 
constraints and no specific obligations at all.11 
 
The normative dimension of guanxi refers to the normative expectations that are embedded in 
the relationship linking two people. The closer the relationship is, the more a sense of moral 
obligation becomes. Guanxi relationships balance obligation and sanction, on the one hand, 
and flexibility and instrumentality, on the other hand. When the normative dimension is too 
strong, flexibility and instrumentality diminish. When the normative dimension is too weak, 
obligations and collective sanctions will be too few to ensure reciprocity over the long term. 
The process of creating a reliable network of relatives and friends always involves the careful 
balancing of normative constraints and instrumental flexibility. 
 
 
Instrumental Dimension 
 
People need to cultivate a network of relatives and friends because they have the potential of 
providing access to material and ideal resources that are or may become available. An 
exchange of favours, in this case, is based on rational calculation of cost and benefits. How 
instrumentally and mutually important the relationship is to the two persons will determine 
how close the guanxi is or may become. Guanxi, however, does not exist when a relationship 
is purely instrumental. A purely instrumental relationship is usually one shot (or short-term) 
and unstable (Hwang, 1987). To turn an instrumental into a guanxi relationship (i.e. a 
relatively long-term and stable relationship) either the normative or the affective dimension 
has to be strengthened (or most of the time, both). When one interacts with someone 
categorically defined as a stranger, the normative constraints are few or non-existent, and the 
affective level is minimal. The major consideration governing such interactions will be 
instrumental. For instance, when Chinese interact with non-Chinese, there is a perception that 
“foreigners” do not recognise the norms of Chinese society, and hence “respectful 
instrumentality” is the appropriate form of interaction with them.  
 
 
Affective Dimension 
 
                                                          
10
 Zhong (faithfulness), cheng (sincerity) and xin (trustworthiness) are the normative expectations defining the 
ties between friends. Hwang (1987: 954) describes these principles as a part of renqing, as “a set of social norms 
by which one has to abide in order to get along well with other people in Chinese society”. 
11
 Social obligation that acts as normative constraint between strangers is minimal among Chinese, simply 
because obligations are expected only from those who have particular relationships with you. See Hwang (1987: 
951-2). 
 
Social Logic as Business Logic 6 
 
One can develop close guanxi relations with another person solely because an affective bond 
forms between the two persons.12 As Fei (1992) notes, such affective ties are usually gender 
specific. Men normatively form such ties with other men and women with other women. 
These ties are decidedly emotional. Maybe one likes the other person's personality, or maybe 
the two share similar world-views, tastes or habits. Whatever the personal reasons, the two 
individuals want to keep a relationship going, and so the two actively engage in reciprocity. 
The greater the degree of affection (ganqing), the more reciprocity is practised, and the more 
reciprocity is practised, the closer and more emotion filled the relationship becomes. 
 
These three dimensions are only analytical distinctions. In reality, one’s specific guanxi with 
another person simultaneously combines normative expectations, interests and a sense of 
mutual affection. What favours are offered and exchanged is determined by balancing the 
normative obligations, instrumental calculations, and affection.13 If all three are aligned in the 
same direction, the magnitude will be strong and the relationship will be relatively stable. 
Each dimension reinforces the others, so that a more stable and long-term guanxi can be 
established. Affection or ganqing, however, would have to be considered as the sine qua non 
of any guanxi relationship, for without emotional sincerity the chances for long-term 
reciprocity are diminished.14 A relationship which is both instrumental and affective is 
certainly better, i.e. stronger and more stable, than a relationship with only one of them. A 
stronger ganging can always produce a stronger guanxi. If one wants to cultivate guanxi, one 
must cultivate ganging, which is in some respects the easiest of the three dimensions to 
increase. When the social positions of both parties (the normative dimension) and the utility 
of the relationships (the instrumental dimension) are relatively fixed, then increasing the 
intensity of the affective dimension is a way to have closer guanxi.15 
 
The three dimensions, however, do not necessarily run in the same direction. One has moral 
obligations to one’s cousin, but one does not necessarily like or want to do business with him 
or her. People are often closely connected to others with whom they have no blood 
relationship. It is not uncommon for mutual admiration between two friends to be so strong 
that each would be willing to do almost anything for the other with very little instrumental 
calculation. Inconsistency among the three dimensions, therefore, does not prevent the 
development of a guanxi relationship. It is the case, however, that a guanxi with dimensions 
going in different directions will be weaker than if they are all aligned. 
                                                          
12
 An extreme scenario would be yijiannrgu (like old friend at first sight). 
13
 Fei’s scheme of social relationships is basically normative (see Fei, 1992: chaps. 4-6). He sees Chinese social 
relationships as relationships defined by differential moral expectations. His scheme understates the emotional 
and instrumental components. Hwang (1987, on the other hand, neglects the normative aspect of the social 
relationships and emphasises only the expressive and the instrumental components. Even though guanxi is 
supposed to be the combined consideration of the three components on the same level, it may not “appear” to be 
so in some situations. In business guanxi, for example, the normative and affective dimensions will always be 
emphasised in an explicit way. The instrumental consideration, which actually is the essential part, will always 
remain as implicit (Chen, 1990). 
 
14
 Kipnis (1997: 23) even suggests that guanxi and ganqing “are often interchangeable”. Guanxi, as a term, 
seems to refer more to the material aspects, while ganqing seems to be more about the human feeling involved. 
But at the same time, “[g]uanxi involve human feeling and ganqing involves material obligation”. They are two 
sides of the same coin. 
 
15
 Gift giving, invitations to banquets, showing concern, visiting when the other is sick, and so 
forth, are the cultural "tacticn to be used to increase the affection between the two parties. 
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Although inconsistency in the dimensions of guanxi does not necessarily lead to conflict, 
sometimes it does. A typical and widely reported scenario (DeGlopper, 1972; Fei, 1992; 
Hwang, 1987; King, 1991) in which inconsistency does lead to conflict occurs when one 
desires a more instrumental calculation than is permitted by norms or affection. Transactions 
between buyers and sellers become uneasy when personal factors are involved. Sellers want 
to get a better price than they are able to get when they sell to a relative or friend. Buyers 
want to choose a better product than they are able to do when they buy from a relative or 
friend. In these cases, one may try to avoid intermixing guanxi and business in some contexts. 
 
Using these three dimensions of guanxi logic, Chinese place people with whom they are 
interacting into categorical frames, such as jiaren (family members), shuren (familiar person) 
and mosheren (stranger), or zijiren (one of us, insider) and wairen (outsider). The 
classifications, however, are always elastic. The relationship between two persons can always 
change, whenever there is a qualitative or quantitative change in one or more of the 
dimensions. The person involved can be “upgraded” from wairen to zijiren (or be 
“downgraded”) or even go from shuren to jiaren, as commonly occurs with fictive kinship 
ties, such as when two individuals “become brothers” or “become sisters”. Because the 
different combinations of the three dimensions lead to different behavioural orientations, 
there is a great complexity and infinite variety in the way guanxi logic is applied in everyday 
life. Moreover, to the people interacting in daily life, there is always ambiguity in how people 
fit into the categorical matrix of Chinese society. As Fei (1992) notes, however, ambiguity is 
the very essence of this Chinese mode of association. All classifications are necessarily 
elastic and allow changes and constant subjective, contextual reinterpretations. 
 
 
THE INDETERMINATE LOGIC OF GUANXl 
 
The basic operative logic of guanxi is the logic of reciprocity. A long-term and stable guanxi 
should be a relationship of mutual benefit in the long run. This mutual benefit is realised 
through “a serialized balanced reciprocity of obligations and favors” (Yao, 1987: 92). The 
balancing of reciprocity, however, is not formulaic and predetermined. First, there is no 
specification on when one should return a favour. Owing someone a favour only obligates 
one to return it a later time, but at no particular time in the future. In fact, returning a favour 
too fast will likely be interpreted as not wanting to develop the relationship into a long term 
one. 
 
Secondly, the actual amount of exchange for each time can be flexible, even though the 
overall mutual exchange of benefit should be more or less equal, or at least both sides should 
feel that way. The return of a favour will not always be of equal value. Often the norm is to 
return a larger favour than the one received earlier (Fei, 1992: 124). Also, giving favour to 
another without asking for any in return in the short run can strengthen guanxi. In this sense, 
one can “store” potential returns from the others and in order to access to favours at some 
time in the future when there is a need. The exchange is, therefore, not a balanced ledger 
between debtor and creditor. In principle, favours should equal out in the long run, but at any 
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one point in time they will be out of balance.16 People actually feel better when others owe 
them favours (qian renqing), rather than the reverse. 
 
Thirdly, not only is the amount of exchange not defined, but also the kind of favour for the 
exchange is intentionally left open. Renqing, a personal favour in an abstract form,17 is 
considered to be the medium of exchange. Every time you do someone a favour, the favour 
will be considered as a renqing. The content of renqing, however, is not defined, and so a 
renqing can be anything that can be exchanged. Frequently, the items exchanged are of a very 
different nature. For instance, one side may lend money and the other side may help one’s 
daughter get into a good school. There is, literally, no way to quantify the favour in order to 
find out whether they are of equal value. Indeed, the whole point of renqing is its 
indeterminate nature: open-ended, flexible, oriented towards a future that is unknown and 
unknowable. What is important is a continuing cultivation of the guanxi bond in the present, 
so that one is assured of help, whatever that help might be and whenever it is needed. 
 
Fourthly, there is no well-defined (or objective) standard on how much one should give in 
return for an earlier favour. With a guanxi, you are supposed to return a favour, but the 
amount to be returned is a calculation based on a weighing of the three dimensions of guanxi. 
If you are expected to return a favour, the nature of the favour will first be determined by 
what is normatively appropriate, such as the amount of money in the red pouch that one gives 
at the wedding for one’s cousin’s daughter (Yan, 1996). The next consideration will be the 
degree of affection mutually recognised between the two individuals. The extent to which one 
likes the other person has an effect on the magnitude and kind of favour one returns. Finally, 
one instrumentally calculates the amount that one can afford to return. A good guanxi partner 
understands that the other might want to reciprocate at a higher level than he or she is 
actually able to do. 
 
The logic of guanxi is governed by the logic of reciprocity. This logic is necessarily fuzzy. 
The exchange is supposed to be unspecified, and therefore a favour is flexible in the timing, 
amount, and content.18 Both sides of a guanxi relationship accept and encourage this 
indeterminacy, because both know guanxi is ongoing and long-term. In this sense, guanxi is 
more a process than a condition. If mutual commitment is assured through friendship and 
trust, then the exchange will be continuous and constantly “re-created” (Kipnis, 1997: 25). 
Indeterminacy and trust go hand in hand. Ideally, guanxi relationships are aimed more at 
future uncertainties than at present needs. Such relationships have to be developed through an 
on-going process. If one returns a renqing abruptly and quickly, one is indicating that the 
relationship should not be extended into the future. The accounting of renqing is only 
balanced and clear when one or both sides of the exchange relationship no longer want the 
relationship. Even death does not necessarily end a guanxi relationship. After one of the two 
parties dies, the children of the deceased may, depending on the circumstances, feel obliged 
to carry on the renqing of the parent. 
                                                          
16
 If one side is always getting more or is taking advantage of the other side, this panxi will be unstable and 
cannot be maintained for too long. But, in a life-long relationship, whether the exchange is equal or not is not a 
major concern. 
17
 Renqing literally means “human’s feelings”. It is in fact considered to be a human (with feelings) only if you 
are kind enough to do favour to the others. You have no “human touch” if you refuse to do someone a favour. 
18
 By contrast, if Chinese are dealing with strangers with whom they have no guanxi, everyexchange will consist 
of “haggling over every ounce” (jinjinjiao). 
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GUANXI AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
 
As a social phenomenon, guanxi implies a society that is structured primarily in terms of 
social relationships. In fact, a number of sociologists of Chinese society, most prominently 
Fei Xiaotong (1992), have made an important contrast between the organisational dimensions 
of Western and Chinese societies. Western societies, on the one hand, are structured through 
organisational boundaries and organisational identities; even the family is a type of 
organisation. Although relationships may have affective aspects, they are still defined in legal 
terms, so that members of a family (for example, wives and children) have the legal rights 
according to their status, as well as general legal rights as citizens. By contrast, Chinese 
societies are organised through the medium of categorical social relationships, which 
provides the structural matrix within which Chinese cognitively structure all aspects of their 
daily life. The categories of relationships are a more significant organisational feature of 
Chinese society than group boundaries. 
 
Given the pervasiveness and taken-for-granted quality of this differential mode of 
association, guanxi for Chinese implies a general orientation to how social relationships 
ought to be developed outside the family. Accordingly, Chinese often prefer interaction (or 
social exchange) with people with whom they already have some kind of social connection. 
At any one point in time, these social connections create a social network in which one’s 
future is potentially vested. The network formed by one’s numerous guanxi thus becomes 
one’s framework for personal social and economic mobility. This framework represents a 
“preference scheme”, a ranking of those with whom one has vested interests and 
commitments to interact and with whom he or she is willing to apply (in various degrees) the 
logic of reciprocity. 
 
It is in this distinctive socially constructed world of social relationships that economic 
activity is embedded. As a number of studies have shown, Chinese businessmen prefer to use 
guanxi as a primary medium for business relationships (e.g., Chen, 1994, 1998; DeGlopper, 
1972; Greenhalgh, 1988; Hamilton, 1996; Kao, 1993; Redding, 1990; Hwang, 1987; 
Weidenbaum, 1996).19 Among Chinese, as among Westerners, the activity of buying and 
selling (maimai) is about maximising gains and realising instrumental interests. Guanxi 
involves instrumental calculations, as well as considerations of long- and short-term interests. 
                                                          
19
 Guanxi is also important for business transactions in Mainland China, but in a rather different sense. In 
Mainland China, guanxi has been considered as an institutional substitute in many arenas, including the business 
sector. When social and economic resources cannot be obtained through regular institutional framework, guanxi 
or personal connection will become a substitute channel. Guanxi here is still “personal”. The main difference, 
however, is that it has become more instrumental and utilitarian during the reform era (Gold, 1985). Even 
though the normative and affective components are still essential for the existence of guanxi, the instrumental 
component is a lot more important for guanxi to be activated. In order to benefit from your guanxi, i.e., to get 
what you want, you have to be prepared for a more immediate return of benefits to the other side. Guanxi, in 
Mainland China, does not refer to the personal relationships per se anymore, but refers more to the use of such 
personal relationships to pursue instrumental goals. It becomes more specific and materialistic. Favour exchange 
is mostly based on immediate benefit calculation. Gift exchange, which used to be a practice to maintain a good 
guanxi, for example, is now, to an extent, a means of pursuing political and economic interests (Yan, 1996; 
Yang, 1994). Guanxi that is largely based on materialistic exchange is less guided by social norms, is more 
costly to maintain, is less stable, and lasts for a shorter term than guanxi that is based on an affective bonds. 
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Conducting business according to the logic of guanxi, therefore, implies no trace of 
irrationality or of doing something out of the ordinary. Moreover, for Chinese to do business 
with each other in any other way, even the Western way through laws and contracts, might 
seem irrational and extraordinary. Therefore, as in Western societies, in Chinese societies, 
doing business runs according to the same rules as living an every-day existence. 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Chinese like to do business with other people who 
understand the same rules as they do. Because guanxi is built on the rules of reciprocity, the 
rules can only be enforced within a network of people who understand and who are morally 
obligated to follow the rules. In this context, everyone linked together through interpersonal 
networks observes the actions of everyone else, and thus everyone shares the same rules and, 
collectively or individually, can sanction those who do not live up to their obligations. 
Except at the margins, therefore, guanxi networks normally do not incorporate strangers. If 
one is doing business with someone with whom one has guanxi, rather than an anonymous 
person in the market-place, one can expect transactional relationships to be conducted 
according to the rules of guanxi. 
 
We can further conceptualise the context of business in Chinese societies by means of game 
theory, most clearly with Robert Axlerod’s well-known demonstrations (1984) about the 
outcomes of the “prisoner’s dilemma” game. He shows that the most successful solution to an 
iterated game in which one can choose either to maximise one’s gain at the expense of 
another or to co-operate and share gains is always co-operation. We can think of guanxi as a 
clearly developed inter-subjective set of “tit-for-tat” rules that greatly enhance the level of co-
operation in Chinese society. The logic of co-operation is similar to that found in a great 
many locations (Axlerod, 1984). Where the Chinese may differ from other societies is the 
extent to which these “tit-for-tat” rules provide the institutional foundation for everyday 
interaction. 
 
Conceptualised in this way, guanxi is not so much a cultural logic as it is a structural system 
of repeated interactions based on ongoing, more or less equal exchanges of favours. The daily 
practice of guanxi in all Chinese societies creates an institutional base for ongoing business 
activity. For most businesses, only some transactions occur among guanxi partners. If a 
particular transaction is between guanxi partners, then the economic calculation needs to 
include long-term, as well as short-term dimensions. If long-term calculations applies in a 
specific instance, then one would expect one's transactional partner to be willing to offer 
favours if needed, to be flexible and considerate, and to be oriented to long-term mutual 
benefits of both partners. 
 
Long-term business relationships are cultivated in the same way as long-term social 
relationships, according to the three dimensions described above. Developing the ganqing 
component of relationship,20 for example, is a way to strengthen them, shifting the underlying 
calculations from the short to the long term. If one finds a business partner who is good (for 
example, a subcontractor), one would try to develop the relationship socially in order to 
                                                          
20
 Whether ganqing is the most important dimension is situational. Chen (1994), for example, suggests that the 
combined effect of ganqing and instrumental calculation may depend on one’s social and economic status or 
strength. Ganging is considered to be relevant only when both sides of the guanxi are relatively equal in social 
status and economic strength. In business guanxi, if one’s status and strength are similar to those whom you try 
to “connect”, affection may weigh more than instrumental calculations. If their status and strength are not 
equivalent, then instrumental calculation will dominate. Affection, even if present, will be devalued in this case. 
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maintain it over future good and bad times. Such a relationship is, foremost, a business 
relationship (DeGlopper, 1972), but the process of making the relationship long-term requires 
that the relationship be maintained by using a social logic as well as a business one. Being 
joined in a long-term relationship makes profit-making co-operative and mutually beneficial, 
and converts individual enterprises into a collective venture. 
 
Guanxi in business is an iterated process and not a condition of being. It works like the 
lubricant for a machine. A manufacturer who needs a subcontractor will look for one among 
his friends or even his friends’ friends. He may prefer to find a subcontractor from someone 
whom he knows directly or through his network of connections. His final selection, however, 
would not be based solely, or even primarily, on the closeness of guanxi. Guanxi cannot 
make things work; it only make things work better. If a machine itself is not working, a 
lubricant will be of no use. One would not subcontract to one’s best friend if that friend could 
not promise a reasonable price, if not the cheapest; or produce goods of an acceptable quality 
(Zheng and Liu, 1995). If the relationship is not beneficial, regardless of whether the 
transaction partner is a relative or not, one would de-emphasise the social component of the 
relationship and perhaps even cut both the instrumental and social ties. Moreover, to continue 
with an economic relationship that is well known not to be beneficial will raise questions 
among one’s friends and colleagues about how trustworthy one is in the long run. 
 
In Chinese societies, therefore, business activities include a social dimension. This social 
dimension does not make an economic decision less “economic”. Rather, the social logic 
adds another level and more complexity to economic calculation. One's economic success 
depends not only on the competitiveness of one’s products, although that is certainly 
important; but also on how good one’s guanxi is with others and to what extent one is viewed 
as a worthy guanxi partner. In Chinese economies, business reputation means a lot. By 
supplementing business relationships with social logic, “non-economic relations are 
transformed into those having material significance” (Yao, 1987: 97). 
 
In normative terms, Chinese businesspeople prefer personal dealings to impersonal ones, 
long-term relationships to short-term ones. This normative orientation differs from that of 
Western economies. Western market institutions assume atomistic actors, impersonal 
dealings and profit maximisation, even though a good many market participants may do 
otherwise. In fact, at the level of individuals, Westerners and Chinese may not be so far apart. 
At a minimum, we should not exaggerate the differences. Many of the most successful 
Chinese entrepreneurs would likely want to move toward more impersonal/contractual 
transactions, and thereby avoid the many requests for increasing guanxi that comes with 
business success. And many Western entrepreneurs find personal and informal transactions 
beneficial and practise them regularly. The differences between Chinese and Western 
business contexts increase at the institutional and normative levels. Regardless of individual 
desires, the institutional and inter-subjective foundations of the economies differ 
dramatically. The transactional matrix in Chinese economies is personalised through the 
shared use of reciprocity as a normative standard. Equally, the framework of business in 
Western economies rests on contract and the de-personalised nature of corporate law. These 
institutional differences lead to differences in economic outcomes, as we will now explain. 
 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF INTERFIRM NETWORKS 
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The use of guanxi among Chinese businesspeople spawns the formation of interfirm 
networks. Quite a number of writers (Kao, 1993; Redding, 1990; Hamilton,1996) have 
discussed this propensity towards networking in Chinese economies and believe it to be one 
of the main reasons Chinese entrepreneurs have been so successful in recent years. In the past 
decade, Western business networks have also proliferated, as has the scholarly discussions 
about how networking works in Western business contexts. By contrasting the networking of 
firms in the Chinese and Western contexts, we can further illustrate the differences between 
economic organisation and economic outcomes based on those differences. 
 
In Western economies, inter-firm co-operation has become a commonplace strategy by which 
firms enhance their competitive advantage through making purposeful contractual alliances 
with other firms. Scholars (Oliver, 1990; Powell, 1990; Podolny and Page, 1998) observing 
such alliances see network forms of organisation as a kind of governance structure that differ 
from intrafirm hierarchies, on the one hand, and co-ordination through contracts based on 
impersonal market transactions, on the other hand.21 Network forms of governance introduce 
a level of flexibility not found in either hierarchy or market. In times of rapid economic 
change, the inability to foresee and thus to limit risks makes interfirm alliances an effective 
way to manage opportunities for growth, while each firm simultaneously concentrates on its 
core competencies. Since contracts between partners in an alliance cannot possibly foresee all 
contingencies that may arise in the future, interfirm networks also require non-contractual 
dimensions, such as trust and the willingness to co-operate. Podolny and Page (1998) see this 
willingness to co-operate and the ethic of trust as the defining elements of inter-firm 
networks, characteristics that distinguishes them from market and hierarchical forms of 
economic organisation.22 In fact, achieving mutual trust, rather than exercising direct control, 
is now seen to be the preferred way to monitor inter-firm exchanges, a recognition that has 
now generated a sizable organisational literature about how to create the necessary trust to 
form a lasting alliance (Das and Teng, 1998; Doney et al., 1998; Lane and Bachmann, 1996; 
Lewicki et al., 1998; Lyons and Mehta, 1997; Nooteboom, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
 
Judging from these accounts, it appears that both Western firms and Chinese firms 
extensively use interfirm networks to enhance their businesses, and both rely on mutual trust 
as the way to monitor co-operative ventures. A closer look, however, reveals substantial 
differences. In the first place, the networks themselves are quite different. In a Western 
context, interfirm alliances connect firms, whereas in a Chinese context, guanxi connects 
people, which in turn may or may not connect firms. Secondly, the institutional foundations 
on which alliances are based also differ. Western business alliances rest, in the last instance, 
on the contractual agreement firms reach and the legal framework on which the contracts are 
based. Guanxi relationships, in the last instance, rest on mutual trust, individual reputation, 
and the inter-subjectively based normative order in which guanxi relationships are embedded. 
Thirdly, trust between the two cases rests on very different grounds. In a Western business 
environment, trust is separate from the contractual basis of the alliance. Trust is generated 
over time through long-term interaction, and may additionally have interpersonal dimensions. 
For instance, as long as there is no legal violation, a breach of trust may incur few or no 
                                                          
21
 Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994) list at least four types of network-based collaborations where each pursues 
different kinds of co-operation. Oliver (1990), on the other hand, suggests six types of interorganisational 
relations. 
 
22
 Transaction cost economics, for example, most of the time suggests that trust is a redundant concept 
(Nooteboom et al. 1997; Williamson, 1993). 
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sanctions from other firms linked in a network. In the Chinese environment, however, trust is 
a normative and an essential part of a relationship. Without trust, there is no meaningful 
relationship, and a breach of trust, if serious enough, would lead to ostracism from the 
network and lost of reputation. 
 
For these reasons, trust among Western businesspeople is more difficult to generate and 
maintain, but less problematic than among Chinese businesspeople. Trust is more difficult to 
generate and maintain among Western businesspeople because it is a product of localised 
interaction between firms instead of an aspect of a generalised normative order, as it is in 
Chinese societies. For Western contexts, as Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994: 390) said, “the 
level of cooperation increases with each agreement between the same partners and individual 
partners become more skilled at learning through alliances”. Trust is generated by interaction, 
but is not institutionally monitored, so that breaches of trust can be effectively sanctioned. 
The only way effectively to monitor interfirm co-operation and to reduce the risk of 
opportunism is through adding a legal layer to the relationship (Arrighetti et al., 1997; Das 
and Teng, 1998; Lane and Bachmann, 1996; Luhmann, 1979; Zucker, 1986). The 
omnipresence of law in the West pushes all relationships, even the most affective ones, into a 
legal framework, a fact making network forms of organisation ultimately dependent on legal 
controls. Networks in the Western context, therefore, represents instrumental connections 
either that are institutionalised through formal means or that remain as informal relationships 
without a stable institutional foundation that can used to sanction violators (Dean et al., 
1997). Trust in Western societies, therefore, is not as problematic as it is in Chinese societies 
because people always fall back on the laws, which results in trust being ephemeral and 
situational, instead of stable and normative. 
 
By contrast, in the Chinese context, trust is relatively easy to generate and maintain, but 
remains problematic. Interpersonal trust is easy to generate because the normative rules for 
doing so are widespread and strongly prescriptive. Breaches of interpersonal trust become 
violations of general rules that everyone can sanction. Therefore, trust-bearing relationship 
are supported by a moral community that sees the practice of guanxi logic and trust as 
“normal”, as “expected” social practices that are the very foundation of social life. 
 
In Chinese societies, from an individual’s point of view, trust is a problematic feature of 
everyday social life. Just as in the Western societies, where violations of the law are 
commonplace and sanctionable, in Chinese societies, breaches of trust are also commonplace 
and sanctionable to some degree. The ubiquity of guanxi as everyday practice, even as the 
way of demonstrating one’s humanness,23 makes trustworthiness a primary quality of people, 
a quality that people learn how to cultivate in themselves (at least for purpose of social 
presentation) and to evaluate in others. From an individual’s point of view, trust is necessarily 
generated, maintained and sanctioned within the small group of people with whom one has 
relationships. For Western societies, laws are universally applicable. Laws provide 
generalised institutional foundations for groups that may vary tremendously in size and 
function. By contrast, in Chinese societies, although the norms are general to the society, 
guanxi and trust are actualised only small groups. Even though guanxi-based networks can be 
quite extensive, connecting weak ties (friends of friends) into a strongly cohesive network, 
they remain interpersonal in character. 
                                                          
23
 The phrase zuoren (acting as person) has the distinctly social meaning suggests that a person is capable of 
entering into sincere relationships with others. Such a person is not selfish. 
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Because of these institutional differences between Chinese and Western societies, we can 
conceptualise interfirm linkages in the Western business settings as “strong-firm networks”. 
The firm is the core, the institutionally solid foundation, and the ties to other firms are 
generally weak and situational. In the Chinese context, however, networks, may be thought of 
as “strong-tie networks”, where the firms are less important than the network they constitute 
(Redding, 1991). The firms, in the form of actual business ventures, may come and go, but 
relationships persist over time. For example, in the last two decades, the composition of 
Taiwan’s manufactured exports has constantly changed, as world demand and profits from 
production shifted dramatically. In one period of change, Taiwan’s footwear industry moved 
to Mainland China. Back in Taiwan, the same people who were once making shoes 
reconstituted their networks to make other products, the most unusual of which was 
helicopters (Kao and Hamilton, 1999). Firms may change, but the relationships continue and 
are capable of being reconstructed for other purposes. 
 
Strong-firm networks that exist in Western economies are capable of anything that individual 
firms may be capable of. Boeing, for instance, once was a vertically integrated firm making 
commercial and military aeroplanes. Now Boeing has become a very complex global network 
of independent and subsidiary firms that still make aeroplanes. Networks are a means to 
recreate greater efficiencies. By contrast, strong-tie networks in Chinese economies are 
capable of doing activities beyond what any single firm could do. Co-operation is the 
essential element of the activities. For example, the so-called “satellite-assembly systems” are 
standard ways to produce products in Taiwan. Products manufactured by such networks 
range widely from bicycles to computers. Based on orders from overseas buyers, a network 
of entrepreneurs divides the manufacturing process into discrete steps that can be allocated to 
a network of firms. Each firm in the network produces a part or parts of the final product. All 
parts are assembled at central sites and the final product is shipped to the buyer. As products 
change the actual composition of firms in a network also changes. Because relationships are 
personal, and therefore multidimensional, sometimes one person is a primary manufacturer 
and next time the same person is loaning capital to someone else taking the lead role. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: THE CHINESE WAY OF DOING BUSINESS IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
In the preceding discussion, we have contrasted Western laws and Chinese interpersonal 
norms as if they were mutually exclusive phenomena. In the global economy that has 
developed in the last half of the twentieth century, it is clear that Western laws and Chinese 
interpersonal norms coexist. Chinese entrepreneurs are global businesspeople. They vary 
greatly in terms of their “Chineseness” (Wang, 1999) and in terms of whether they are able 
and willing to do business with other Chinese by using the logic of guanxi. The key question 
is, therefore, to what extent are global laws governing commercial transactions supplanting 
Chinese ways of doing business? Based on our own research in Taiwan and the Mainland, the 
answer is surprisingly straightforward. 
 
A global legal framework and local Chinese norms for doing business supplement more than 
conflict with each other. The real conflict between laws and guanxi is found on the Chinese 
Mainland. This is the third meaning of guanxi that we alluded to in the introduction. We 
should understand this type of guanxi, however, not as an extension of the patterns we have 
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discussed in this chapter, but rather as a corruption of them. The widespread collusion 
between Chinese entrepreneurs and state officials is being attacked by high-level politicians, 
not only because it is illegal according to Mainland law, but also because it undermines the 
moral foundation for "normal" interactions among businesspeople and between 
businesspeople and state officials. The observations (Guthrie, 1998, 1999) that this collusion 
is declining as Chinese businesses become more globally integrated and competitive is 
certainly correct, but it does not mean that Chinese businesspeople are beginning to interact 
with each other strictly in legal terms. Quite the contrary is true. In Chinese society guanxi 
has always applied, and continues to apply to relatively small groups of people linked 
together in reciprocal networks. Until recently, there were not many options about how to 
interact with people, whether Chinese or not, who were not part of one's own network. Global 
legal framework introduces a set of regulatory institutions that can apply to those with whom 
one is not otherwise connected. 
 
These global laws will certainly help shape Chinese economic institutions. Firms are 
incorporated legally. Corporations listed on local stock exchanges use Western accounting 
practices, as they are required to do. Environment laws, labour laws and product-liability 
laws are all taking effect, and are changing the way Chinese business is being done. But this 
globalising legal framework adds an institutional environment in which guanxi logic works 
even better than before. Now distant relationships can be monitored through laws, while close 
relationships can be personal and based on trust and reciprocation. For instance, many 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs are eager to develop joint ventures with American and European 
firms, as is common in sub-contract manufacturing. Such entrepreneurs would not think of 
using guanxi logic to make the deal, and in fact they normally insist on a legally binding 
contract. Once they have the agreement, however, the same entrepreneurs will put together a 
production network consisting of independent Chinese-owned firms without a legally binding 
contract among any of the Chinese participants. Legal logic binds the first agreement and 
guanxi logic binds the second, and together both sets of agreements enhance the control and 
flexibility of the Chinese entrepreneurs in their effort to make money (Kao and 
Hamilton, 2000). 
 
It is our conclusion, therefore, that global law enhances the ability of Chinese entrepreneurs 
and their firms to be players in the global economy. Their very success in the global economy 
paradoxically, however, enhances their use of guanxi logic among their close colleagues. The 
success of a great many Chinese entrepreneurs in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mainland China, as 
well as Southeast Asia, rests on their ability to put together flexible networks and to engage 
in high-risk ventures. The learned process of building these networks and making them so 
flexible and so efficient accentuates the social foundation on which they are founded. The use 
of guanxi is an essential aspect of the long-term calculations that form the institutional 
foundations of these networks. 
 
Therefore, legal rules and guanxi logic work hand-in-glove to make Chinese entrepreneurs 
the formidable businesspeople they have become. The interpersonal and processural nature of 
Chinese networks makes them highly adaptable to different economic conditions. When these 
processes are embedded in an economic environment structured through legal institutions, 
then the levels of economic risks are further reduced and predictability increased. If our thesis 
is correct, the spread of global legal institutions will set the stage for further advances in the 
global success of Chinese economies, a success that will continue to be based on the Chinese 
ability to put together interpersonal networks based on reciprocation-guanxi networks. 
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